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My empirical research started with China’s experiment of rural reform during the
1980s-90s. According to the principle of experiment, only through a process of incessant
falsification can we approach the truth. In the process my preliminary conclusion was the
theory of institutional costs. However in later comparative studies on different countries, I
found that institutional cost was not my innovation. Instead my theoretical innovation should
be the discovery that the vested interest groups which appropriate the returns of an
institutional transition constantly transfer the institutional costs to disadvantaged groups
located at a less privileged position in the institutional structure. Therefore I revise my theory
as the theory of transfer of institutional costs.
Most of the theorists agree that poverty is institutional. So-called institutional poverty is
in fact caused by the transfer of institutional costs to disadvantaged groups. Institutional
transition of any kind is a process of transferring the institutional costs tier by tier down to
disadvantaged groups by the dominant interested blocs in order to further appropriate more of
the accrued returns.
It explains why the environmental devastation is increasingly exacerbated. That is
because the disadvantaged groups could at least voice disagreement. However the
environment is voiceless. When the institutional costs accumulated on the back of the
disadvantaged groups become unbearable, they are being increasingly transferred to the
natural environment.
Institutional economics has made innovative elaborations on neo-classical economics.
When we apply these innovations to understand the institutional transition of developing
countries, we find something significant. I have to emphasize: institution is derivative. That is
to say: institution in itself cannot explain other phenomena. It is a phenomenon that needs to
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be explained. My position is therefore different from institutional determinism which tends to
put the blame on institution whenever it tries to explain undesirable phenomena of all kinds1.
Of course, theorists can then conveniently give an explanation to the public in regard of
various misdeeds. But if we ponder on the question, we will ask whence the institution comes?
In particular, how are so-called modern institutions generated? China is a developing country
striving to learn from western modernization. And whence our institution comes is to a large
extent a problem of historical philosophy.
Capitalist civilization has a relatively short history compared with 5000 years of
civilization. Nevertheless its relatively brief existence has been devastating. Since its rise, the
West has orchestrated the transfer of institutional contradictions to developing countries on
three major occasions.
The first occasion was the process of colonial expansion at the beginning of capitalism
caused by European industrialization. In order to expropriate resources and market as well as
to export poor populations, the now-advanced countries seized the most resourceful parts of
the world, namely the Americas, Africa and Australia. Eventually it led to two world wars in
the 20th century.
At the same time, developing countries were being incorporated into the capitalist
system and drawn into the colonial geopolitics of fighting for colonies and
politico-economic/military presence.
The second occasion is the expansion of industrial capital in the middle stage of
capitalism. After the 1950s the rise of the second industrialization in the West led to a transfer
of general manufacturing to the less developed parts of the world. As a result, the imminence
of the Third World War due to pressure of fierce competition was resolved. After War World II,
the labor movement in advanced countries had pressed to improve social welfare. Apart from
the rise of labor cost, the pressure of environmental protection was also being intensified. The
cost of capital was under great pressure to rise. At the same time the world order forged in the
age of classical colonialism began to disintegrate. The global decolonization movement gave
birth to various emerging nation-states which then became the receivers of the transfer of
manufacturing from the advanced countries.
The third occasion starts from the expansion of financial capital at the late capitalism.
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Since the 1990s an evolving financial capital has dominated the competition of globalization.
Global monetization and capitalization is accelerating, which leads to the present scene in the
post-colonial geopolitical strategy: the confrontation between the Dollar Bloc and the Euro
Bloc.
Global cost-transferring is the root of institutional impoverishment. Therefore, institution
is indeed a problem in developing countries. But the problem is not the institution of
developing countries. It is not because their malfunctioning institutions are backward or
wanting. On the contrary, it is because they blindly pursue modernized or westernized
institutions in a precocious manner.
So-called modern institution of developing countries can be traced back to the primitive
accumulation of nation at early industrialization. We merely emphasize that all modern
institutions are derivative. More than 100 nations in the world are developing countries born
after WWII. Due to the stern lessons of the wars, most of these nations are striving to be
strong and rich. Nevertheless the models they learn from are those of their previous suzerains.
As a result the modern institutions of most of the developing countries inevitably bear the
deep influence of the suzerains. They are manifested in institutions like parliament, the legal
system, army and police, etc.
However the first problem confronting nearly all of these developing countries is the
extreme scarcity of capital. As industrialization is an incessant process of adding capital
investment, the intensification of capital is an inherent mechanism of industrialization. As a
result any nation striving to speed up industrialization would have to build institutions seeking
after capital. The governmental policy would then necessarily be pro-capital. For general
developing countries the goal of industrialization is inevitably going to be challenged by an
extreme scarcity of capital. Therefore no matter what kind of ideology or system a nation
proclaims to cling to or insist on, its institutions derived from the goal of modernization
would inherently be pro-capital.
This is not to say that ideology is not important. We just reiterate the basic principle of
classic political economy: any ideology has to be subject to the constraints of the economic
base.
To be plain speaking, the lesson we can learn from these experiences is willy-nilly
inconvenient. If a developing country in pursuit of industrialization/modernization builds up a
superstructure and institutions which are precocious and unhelpful to the primal accumulation
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of capital, the superstructure will react upon its economic base in a negative way. The
institutional costs of modern institutions then become increasingly unbearable. Eventually the
nation is bound to be ensnared in a developmental trap that is hard to get out of.
Thus it can be seen, governments are inherently pro-capital. It is necessarily a policy
proclivity when a nation pursues industrialization under conditions of capital scarcity. It has
been a long time since WWII. But it is rare to witness a successful example of big developing
countries that have achieved industrialization by copying the institutions and cultures of the
West.
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